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Should Pensions be Progressive? 




Recent reforms that aim at reducing the upcoming burdens of population ageing might 
seriously harm low income individuals. An increase in old-age poverty and disability will be 
the  result. Under this prospect, the present paper quantitatively characterizes the optimal 
progressivity  of unfunded pension systems in an overlapping generations model with 
idiosyncratic income, disability and longevity risk as well as endogenous labor supply at the 
intensive and extensive margin. Focusing on the German pension system, our model features 
the most recent demographic  projections and distinguishes three skill classes  with skill-
dependent risk profiles. Starting from a baseline path that reflects a purely earnings related 
pension system, we increase the degree  of progressivity and compute the resulting 
macroeconomic, welfare and efficiency effects. For our most preferred parametrization we 
find an optimal flat-rate pension share of 40 percent. This indicates that in Germany recent 
reforms that aim at raising retirement age and cutting benefit levels should be complemented 
by increases in pension progressivity, since improved insurance provision dominates higher 
labor supply distortions. In addition, we also find that reductions in the benefit level (i.e. 
privatization) will only reduce economic efficiency. 
JEL-Code: C680, H550, J110, J260. 
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ageing. 
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Population ageing will put severe pressure on public pension systems in Western OECD countries in
the future. Since mostof thesesystemswill notbe ﬁscally sustainable, various reforms have been leg-
islated in thesecountries in recent years. These mainly follow two central targets: the prolongation of
working life and the reduction of labor supply distortionsinduced by the pension system. To achieve
the former of these goals, countries like Denmark, Germany, Norway and the US already have in-
creased or will increase statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 while Austria, Belgium, Portugal and
the UK will equalize normal retirement ages for men and women. In order for this reforms to have a
signiﬁcant effect, most of these countries also reduced incentives for early retirement. Consequently,
effective retirement age is expected to increase in the near future.
The reduction of labor supply distortions is mainly targeted using two strategies. On the one hand,
pension beneﬁts are adapted to life-expectancy to prevent strong increases in future contribution
rates. Germany, Finland and Portugale.g. establishedpensioncalculation formulas thatwill decrease
pension beneﬁts in the case the population ages. Italy, Poland and Sweden changed to so-called
notional deﬁned contribution (NDC) systems in which the notional capital accrued during working
life will be converted into an annuity at the date of retirement. Obviously, when individuals tend
to become older, annual annuity payments will decrease. The other means to reduce labor supply
distortions is to strengthen the tax-beneﬁt linkage. Therefore, countries like France and Austria, that
were calculating pension beneﬁts on the basis of only a few years of working life, now extended their
calculation periods by 15 and 25 years, respectively. The most drastic change, however, took place
in Sweden, where the two tier pension system consisting of a basic and an earnings-related part was
replaced by an NDC systemwith a small means-testedminimum pension. As a result of thesereform
efforts, the pension progressivity index declined noticeably in most OECD countries in recent year,
confer OECD (2005) and OECD (2009).
Yet, the effects of the reforms described above are twofold. Obviously, they will keep the pension
system fundamentally sound and decrease labor supply distortions. However, they might also come
at costs. Hagen et al. (2010) e.g. argue that disability risk tends to rise exponentially with age and
is higher for low than for high income households. Hence, when the number of working years rises
signiﬁcantly, especially poorer individuals will be exposed to higher disability risk for a longer time.
Furthermore, when policy makers aim at strengthening the relation between earnings and pension
beneﬁts and cut beneﬁt levels at the same time, it might be that low income households run short of
resources during their retirement phase. As a consequence, old-age poverty could increase signiﬁ-
cantly, so that recent pension reforms that aim at reducing the burdens from population ageing may
come at huge costs for low income individuals. Hence, policy makers should ask themselves some
very important questions: Is it really efﬁcient to maximize tax-beneﬁt linkage in the pension system?
Under the current pension reforms that target the problem of population ageing, shouldn’t we rather
make the pension system more progressive in order to prevent old-age poverty and guarantee low
income households a reasonable amount of resources?
The literature identiﬁes two main effects of an increase in pension progressivity. On the one hand,
when the link between pension contributions and beneﬁts becomes weaker, contributions to the sys-
tem will more and more be perceived as taxes. Hence, labor supply distortions will increase. On the
other hand, especially in the presence of uncertainty about individual productivity, more progres-
sive pension arrangements also provide insurance against labor market risk. Obviously, the latter
1and the former effects work in opposite directions in terms of efﬁciency. A popular means to identify
which of the two dominates are calibrated overlapping generations models in the spirit of Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987). This framework was already used by Huggett and Ventura (1999) as well as
Nishiyama and Smetters (2008) to quantify the long-run macroeconomic and welfare effects of dif-
ferent pension designs. Fehr and Habermann (2008) in addition compute transition paths between
long-run equilibria and therefore are able to quantify the efﬁciency effects of different degreesof pro-
gressivity in the pension formula. However, this study neglects the problem of population ageing as
well as related burdens and upcoming reforms. Yet, in our view, this is a very important point since,
on the one hand, the increasing ratio between retirees and workers will itself increase labor market
distortions and, on the other hand, old-age poverty and therefore the need for redistribution might
rise from the reform packages discussed above.
The present paper aims at targeting the question of optimal pension progressivity under the problem
of population ageing using the example of the German economy. Germany is a rather interesting
country to study, since it already has brought on the way several pension reforms that will increase
statutory retirement ages and reduce future pension beneﬁts. In addition, the German pension sys-
tem features a nearly perfectearnings relation and pensionbeneﬁts are calculated using the complete
working period. Therefore, labor supply distortions already tend to be very low in this country. As
argued in Breyer and Hupfeld (2009) and Arent and Nagl (2010), Germany expects a signiﬁcant in-
crease in old-age poverty. Therefore the current reform debate calls for at least some redistribution
within the pension system, see Breyer and Hupfeld (2009).
The modelwe usehereextendstheworkofNishiyama and Smetters(2007) and Fehrand Habermann
(2008) in several ways. First, we incorporate a reasonable forecast of survival probabilities, fertility
rates and migration to derive a suitable projection of the future population structure in Germany.
With this approach we are able to incorporate the upcoming burdens of population ageing. Next, in
order to quantify all consequences of rising labor market distortions, we consider labor supply de-
cisions not only at the intensive but also the extensive margin like in Sánchez-Martín (2010) or Jaag,
Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2010), i.e. retirement is an active choice. Finally, a detailed modeling
of household labor market risk is necessary to quantify insurance effects of progressive pension ar-
rangements. We therefore introduce permanent and transitory wage shocks, the former of which are
identiﬁed as household’s skill level. In addition, disability risk is a major risk factor especially for
low income households. In Germany in 2009, about 20 percent of new entries into the pension system
were due to disability, see DRV (2010). Hence, following Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2009),
individuals will face exogenous disability shocks that force them to retire early and receive disability
pensions. With this approach and a detailed modeling of early retirement rules for different types of
agents, we feel that our model features all the important exit pathways to retirement and is therefore
able to adequately capture both the determinants of household labor supply decisions and income
risk factors.
In order to quantify the macroeconomic, welfare and efﬁciency consequences of different degrees
of progressivity, we will proceed as follows: We ﬁrst compute a baseline simulation starting from
2008 onwards. Our base year 2008 will be calibrated to the German economy and the baseline path
features adequate population forecasts and reﬂects the upcoming pressure on the pension system
due to population ageing. The baseline scenario already will include recent pension reforms that aim
at both increasing retirement ages and reducing pension beneﬁts in Germany. We then will compute
reform scenarios in which the degree of progressivity in the pension system varies and quantify
the optimal progressivity in our model setup. We ﬁnd that increasing progressivity of the pension
2system will signiﬁcantly increase economic efﬁciency, since insurance effects outweigh the costs of
labor market distortions. A further reduction in beneﬁt levels, however, will only decrease economic
efﬁciency.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: the next section describes the general equilib-
rium model we use in our quantitative analysis. Sections 3 discusses the calibration of the baseline
scenario. Our simulation results are presented in Section 4, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model economy
This section provides a description of the simulation model we use to quantify our results. A more
equation-based description of our model and a deﬁnition of an equilibrium path can be found in
Appendix A.
2.1 Demographics
Our model is populated by J overlapping generations. At any discrete point t in time, a new gener-
ation is born, the mass of which grows with rate nt compared to the previous one. At the beginning
of life, individuals are (exogenously) assigned a skill level s ∈S . During their life-cycle, they only
survive from period to period with the skill-level, time, and age dependent survival probabilities
ψt,j,s,w h e r eψt,J,s = 0. Since our model abstracts from annuity markets, individuals that die before
the maximum age of J may leave accidental bequests that will be distributed in a lump-sum fashion
across all working individuals. In the following, we will, for the sake of simplicity, omit the indices t
and s wherever possible.
2.2 Endowments and intra-cohort heterogeneity
Individuals start their life with zero assets a1 = 0. Note that we restrict assets to be greater or equal
to zero throughout the whole life cycle, i.e. agents might be liquidity constrained. During their
working phase, they may work up to the maximum time endowment of 1 in each period. Time that
is not devoted to working is consumed as leisure. Labor productivity ej depends on individual’s
skill level s as well as idiosyncratic shocks ηj ∈E . Individuals are assigned a skill level s according
to the probability distribution  s at the beginning of their life and remain in it. Hence, skill level
may be interpreted as a permanent shock. When working in the market, agents will accumulate
pension claims epj ∈Pthat deﬁne their pension payments when retired. In addition to labor market
shocks, they are exposed to the risk of becoming severely disabled and therefore unable to work.
Consequently, individuals’ state is characterized by
zj =( s,aj,epj,ηj,dj,oj) ∈Z ,
where dj = 1 indicates disability. The state oj changes from 0 to 1 in the moment the agent chooses to
retire and therefore to become a regular old-age pensioner.
32.3 The laws of motion for individual states
The budget constraint is
aj+1 =( 1+ r)aj + yj(1 − τ)+bj + pj − T(yj, pj,raj) − (1+ τc)cj,
where future assets aj+1 are derived from current assets (including interest), gross income from labor
yj = wej(1−  j) (which is due to the wage rate for effective labor, individual productivity, and hours
worked), accidental bequests bj and pensions pj, net of payroll taxes τyj,i n c o m et a x e sT(·) and
consumption expenditures cj (including consumption taxes).
Accumulated pension claims consist of both a ﬂat and a perfectly earnings related part. Speciﬁcally
we let








where ¯ y indicates the average labor income of the economy.1 When λ = 0a n dμ = 1, agents face a
perfectly earnings related system, whereas λ = 1 means that the pension system is completely ﬂat.
Setting μ = 0 we can shut down the accumulation of earning points and therefore completely abolish
the pension system. Note that epj+1 = epj holds after retirement.
Weassumeproductivityshockstobeindependentacrossindividuals and tobe identically distributed
across individuals of a speciﬁc skill level. They follow a time and age independent Markov process,
the conditional distribution of which is given by π(ηj+1|ηj).
Beneath labor market shocks, individuals are exposed to disability risk. As with productivity shocks,
disability risk dependson individual skill level. At each age j during the life-cycle an agent may get a
disability or bad health shock with the probability πd
j . Having received this shock, household’sstatus
changes to dj = 1a n doj = 1, since he will not be able to generate labor market income anymore.
A disability pension system described in more detail below will care for the sustenance of disabled
agents. In order to account for utility costs of this bad health shock, we restrict individual leisure
consumption to a value of h < 1 that is lower than the maximum time endowment. This reﬂects the
time cost of health care, e.g. visiting a doctor, or the utility costs of a reduced quality of life.
2.4 Preferences and the decision to retire
Preferences over consumption cj and and leisure  j are assumed to be representable by a time-






with Ψj being the unconditional probability to survive until age j. Due to this separability, we can









1 This implies that the average earning point accumulated per year is equal to 1. Note that in the German pension system
and in our model the amount of earning points that can be accumulated per year is limited to 2.
4Starting at age 60, agents may choose to exit the labor force and retire. Retirement is driven by two
factors in our model. On the one hand, the percentage change in welfare from exiting the labor force
is the most important driver. On the other hand, an individual taste parameter ν = ν(ηj) that is
related to own labor market status ηj captures non-pecuniary or psychological costs of working. This
way of modeling is based on the idea that bad labor market shocks additionally give rise to earlier
retirement beyond the incentives induced by low labor income, i.e. ν (ηj) < 0.2 Speciﬁcally, an agent






j+1 indicate the pensioner and the worker state, respectively, and ν is the psycholog-
ical costs of working measured as a percentage of individual utility.
2.5 Technology
We let the production technology in our model be represented by a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion Y = θK L1− ,w h e r eK measures aggregate capital and L aggregate labor in efﬁciency units. The
parameter   denotes the share of capital in production and θ is a technology parameter. We assume
capital to depreciate at the constant rate δk and ﬁrms to pay corporate taxes on output net of labor
and depreciation costs at rate τk. Since a continuum of ﬁrms produces with the same technology un-
der perfect competition, net marginal products of capital and labor equal the interest rate for capital
r and the wage rate for effective labor w. Finally, in order to account for technological progress, we
follow Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2007) and assume time augmenting technological change.3
Consequently, individual time endowment increases by κ for any individual from period to period.
2.6 Government activity
The government in our model splits into a tax and a pension system. The budgets of both systems
are closed separately. While the consumption tax rate is used to balance the tax system, pension
contributions are chosen in a way that pension contributions equal pension payments.
The tax system In each period t, the government issues new debt and collects taxes on consumption
τc as well as labor and capital income. The income tax code is oriented towards the German tax
system where labor is taxed progressively and capital at a constant rate (after a basic allowance).
The taxation of pensions reﬂects the current transition towards a front-loaded taxation system in
Germany. Therefore, in 2008, 66 percent of pension contributions are exempt from tax, while 56
percentofreceived pensionpaymentshave tobe taxed. Theseratesgradually increase over time until
in 2040, pension contributions are completely deductible and beneﬁts are fully taxed. The revenues
from taxation and debt are used to ﬁnance public expenditure and interest payments on existing
debt.
2 A detailed mathematical formulation of our retirement decisioncan be found in Fehr, Kallweit and Kindermann (2011).
3 Note that, due to the utility function not being of Cobb-Douglas type, we can not assume labor augmenting technolog-
ical change, since this would not be consistent with a balanced growth path.
5The pension system The pension system is run on a pay-as-you-go basis. It collects contributions
at a rate τ from all working households and pays pension beneﬁts to both old-age and disability
pensioners. There are three factors determining the size of a regular old-age pension:
1. The sum of earning points accumulated during the working periods.
2. The adjustment factor that reduces pension payments in the case of early retirement.
3. The actual pension amount (APA) which reﬂects the monetary value of one earning point.
When a worker retires early, i.e. before the so-called normal retirement age, his earning points will
be adjusted in order to account for the prolongation of the retirement period. According to German
law, they are reduced by 3.6 percent for any year the agent retires before the normal retirement age.
A special rule applies to individuals that get disabled – and therefore have to exit the labor force
– before the age of 60, the sustenance of which will be taken care of by the disability pillar of the
pension system. In order to derive their pension payments in line with German law, it is assumed
that they had worked up to the age of 60 with their average productivity. Hence, their pension gets
subsidized in order to correct for the missing years of work.
Individual pension beneﬁts are computed from
pj = epj × APA
where epj denotes accumulated earning points at retirement after adjustment and APA the actual
pension amount. Over time, APA grows with gross labor earnings. In addition, a so-called sus-
tainability factor adjusts APA downwards in the case the number of retirees rises in relation to the
number of workers. This factor is a result of the German pension reforms in 2001 and 2004 an aims
at coping with the problems of an ageing society.4
2.7 Equilibrium conditions
Given a speciﬁc ﬁscal policy, an equilibrium path of the economy has to solve the household deci-
sion problem, reﬂect competitive factor prices, and balance aggregate inheritances with unintended
bequests. Furthermore aggregation must hold, and consumption tax and pension contribution rate
have to balance the tax and pension system’s budgets. Since we assume a closed economy setting,
output has to be completely utilized for private consumption Ct, public consumption Gt and invest-
ment purposes, i.e.
Yt = Ct + Gt +( 1+ nt+1)(1+ κ)Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt.
3 Calibration
Since we use realistic demographic forecasts in our model, our base year 2008 will not be a long-run
equilibrium and the benchmark simulation will be a baseline path simulated under demographic
transition and including recent reforms of the tax and pension system. In the following, we will
4 For a more detailed discussion of this adjustment formula see Fehr et al. (2011).
6discuss how we calibrated the initial year of our simulation model and how our baseline path will
be determined. Then we move on to policy reforms and their macroeconomic, welfare and efﬁciency
consequences.
3.1 Demographic projections
In our model, one period covers one year. We assume agents to start their economically relevant life
at the age of 20 and to live up to a maximum of 100 years. In order to get a reasonable classiﬁca-
tion of skills, we use the International Standard Classifaction of Education (ISCED) of the UNESCO.
We thereby merge levels 0 to 2 (primary and lower secondary education), levels 3 and 4 (higher
secondary education) and levels 5 and 6 (tertiary education) in order to receive 3 skill levels, i.e.
S = {1,2,3}. The initial probability distribution  s is calculated using data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), a description of which can be found in Wagner, Frick and Schupp (2007). In
this representative data set, low-, medium- and high-skilled individuals represent 26, 55 and 19 per-
cent of the population, respectively. Survival probabilities ψj,2 for skill class 2 are taken from the 2000
Life Tables for Germany reported in Bomsdorf (2003). Taking into account the positive correlation
between skill level and life expectancy, we compute probabilities for the low and the high skill class
from ψj,2 in a way that life expectancy between those two differs by 5 years, see von Gaudecker and
Scholz (2007). Consequently, initial life expectancies are 77.1, 79.6 and 82.1 for the three different skill
classes, respectively.
To account for a reasonable demographictransition, wesetthe populationstructurein 2008 to theone
observed in Germany. SB (2009) compares 15 alternative combinations of assumptions with respect
to fertility, life expectancy and migration. Taking one of their "benchmark scenarios", we assume the
total fertility rate to remain constantat 1.4 children perwoman, life expectancyto increase linearly for
any skill class by 7.3 years until 2060 and net migration to rise gradually from 50.000 to 100.000 until
2014. Forthesakeofsimplicity, weassume migrantstoalso have theskillcomposition s andto enter
the economy at age 20. In order to converge to a stable population and be able to compute a long-
run equilibrium, we set the population growth rate nt to 0 and keep life-expectancy and migration
unchanged from 2060 onwards. Figure 1 reportsthe resulting population structure from 2008 to 2100.
As can be seen, we start with a population size of 82 million in 2008 which declines to 65.6 million in
2060. This is quite close to the numbers reported in SB (2009) who project a population size of 64.7
million. With the rise in life expectancy and low fertility rates, the old age dependency ratio – which
is deﬁned as the number of individuals aged 60 or older over the number of people between ages 20
and 59 – increases from currently 46.1 percent to 89.4 in 2060.
3.2 Labor productivity, idiosyncratic risk and the distribution of incomes
Following Love (2007), we let log-productivity for an individual of skill class s evolve over the life-
cycle according to
logej = ς0 + ς1 · j + ς2 · j2/ 100 + ηj
where ηj follows an AR(1) process of the form
ηj =  ηj−1 + εj with εj ∼ N(0,σ2
ε ).
7Figure 1: Projected population structure
In order to estimate productivity proﬁles for the three skill levels, we use inﬂated labor income data
of full-time primary household earners from the SOEP. Our unbalanced data set covers workers be-
tween ages 20 to 60 of the years 1984 to 2006 that were again divided into three skill classes according
to the ISCED standard. This leads us to a total of 83893 observations with 11789, 55015, and 17089 in
the three different classes, respectively. With this data set, we estimate the above equation separately
for any skill class s, using some dummy variables reﬂecting job type and family status as well as an
individual persistent effect. The results of the estimation process can be found in Table 1, standard
errors are reported in parenthesis.
Table 1: Parameter estimates for individual productivity
Low-skilled Middle-skilled High-skilled
Intercept and type ς0 9.6207 9.4190 8.6649
(0.2662) (0.1494) (0.3116)
age term ς1 0.0437 0.0579 0.1025
(0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0064)
age2 term ς2 -0.0500 -0.0649 -0.1090
(0.0052) (0.0031) (0.0074)
AR(1) correlation   0.7244 0.7826 0.7770
(0.0119) (0.0046) (0.0088)
transitory variance σ2
ε 0.0646 0.0737 0.0790
(0.0056) (0.0039) (0.0076)
There are two things to notice. First, we ﬁnd a strong AR(1) correlation of around 0.8 for the error
term ηj, which lies in the range of typical values for these types of models, see e.g. Love (2007) or
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu and Kitao (2009). Second, except for high-skilled, we see a small persistent variance,
which means that our groups are strongly homogeneous. In the highest educational group, however,
there is a certain chance of climbing up into the area of extraordinary high salaries. This makes the
8group somewhat more heterogeneous and explains a higher variance of the individual effect.
In our model, we use the estimated proﬁles in between the ages 20 and 65. Note that, with rising
age, the estimates become more and more biased upwards, since individuals with low productivity,
e.g. due to bad health, might already have become retired. Hence, from the age of 65 onwards, we
assume in line with Eisensee(2005), that productivity depreciatesquadratically until it ﬁnally reaches
zero at age 75. The productivity proﬁles can be seen in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Productivity throughout the life cycle
In terms of income uncertainty, we discretize the estimated AR(1) process, using the procedure de-
scribed in Tauchen and Hussey (1991) with 3 approximation points, since this algorithm delivers
the most accurate results in terms of income distribution, see Kindermann (2010). Table 2 compares
some model outcomes with income and asset inequality measures in Germany for 2007 taken from
SVR (2009). We ﬁnd quite a good match of both the lowest and highest percentile of the income dis-
Table 2: Measures of income inequality
Percentage share of Gini
Lowest 10 % Highest 10 % index
Net Income Model 2.7 22.8 0.284
Data∗ 3.6 24.0 0.290
Assets Model 0.0 39.9 0.617
Data∗ -1.1 61.0 0.799
∗Source: SVR (2009)
tribution as well as the Gini index. Of course, since individuals are not allowed to run into debt and
we do not explicitly account for very high income earners and self-employed, the asset distribution
is more equal in our model than in reality.
93.3 Disability risk
Starting from age 30, we assume the probabilities of becoming disabled to be positive. Hagen et
al. (2010) report disability risk for workers with different skill levels between the ages 30 and 59.
They ﬁnd that the probability to become disabled increases exponentially with age. Consequently,
we also assume exponential growth of disability risk throughout the working life and extrapolate
the probabilities mentioned above from age 59 up to age 70. Figure 3 compares the evolvement of
disability risk in Hagen et al. (2010) on the left hand side with the probabilities used in our model
on the right hand side. Interestingly, disability risk seems to decrease from age 58 to 59. According
Figure 3: Disability risk for different skill levels
to Hagen et al. (2010), this however is due to the fact that agents facing disability shocks so late
in life might also be eligible to a regular old-age pension. Since becoming eligible for disability
pensions is quite some effort – one e.g. needs detailed medical examinations and to ﬁll out many
forms – individuals may choose the easier way of becoming regular old-age pensioners. Hence, the
probability estimates tend to be biased downwards towards age 59.
As consequence of disability, we force workers to retire and let them suffer from a reduction in their
time endowment of 20 percent, i.e. h = 0.8. This reﬂects the time cost of health care, e.g. visiting a
doctor, or the utility costs of a reduced quality of life. Figure 4 shows the loss in income related to
disability for individuals becoming disabled at different points in time.5 Interestingly, the higher an
agent’s skill level, the higher his losses from disability. This is not intuitive in a perfectly earnings re-
lated pensionsystem. However, it becomes clear from the fact that initial income is very similar in the
three skill classes, but the higher skilled face thesteeperincrease in labor productivity throughoutthe
life cycle, see Figure 2. Consequently, their forgone earnings from disability are especially large at the
beginning of the life cycle, while at older ages this difference shrinks noticeably. Furthermore, utility
costs are lowest around the age of 50. This is due to the fact that average productivity is the highest
at this point in the life cycle. Since earning points of a disability pensioner are calculated by assum-
5 The ﬁgures reﬂect compensating variation à la Hicks of becoming disabled. We talk about this variation in more detail
in the next section.
10Figure 4: Welfare loss from disability by age
ing he had worked the remaining years until age 60 with his average productivity, beneﬁts from this
disability subsidy reach their maximum at age 50 and decline with a decreasing labor productivity
afterwards. According to Torrance, Boyle and Horwood (1982), direct utility losses from disabilities
that make individuals unable to work may amount from 30 up to 70 percent. Consequently, we feel
that a maximum average welfare loss of 27 percent is a quite conservative estimate. To further clarify
the impact of our choice for h on efﬁciency effects of our reform, we will also assume different values
for h in a sensitivity analysis.
3.4 Preferences and the decision to retire

















where ρ denotes the intra-temporal elasticity between consumption and leisure and α is a taste pa-
rameter for leisure consumption. γ represents the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution between
consumption in different years. In order to calibrate the parameters of the utility function we ﬁrst
set γ at 0.5, which is in the range of commonly used parameters in these types of models, see ˙ Imro-
horo˘ glu and Kitao (2009). We then chose ρ = 0.6 in order to obtain realistic labor supply elasticities.
In order to set average hours worked in the economy at 0.4, which implies a 40 hours work week
length, we let α = 1.6. Finally, we chose a value of 0.985 for β to obtain a capital to output ratio of
3.5, which is close to the one observed in Germany in 2008. Figure 5 reports wage elasticities of labor
supply for individuals between ages 20 and 60. We thereby distinguish between the short- and the
long-run perspective. While short-run elasticities are calculated within a cross section, long-run ones
are determined throughout the life-cycle of an individual. For example, the short-run labor supply
elasticity of an individual aged 40 is computed from his relative change in labor supply resulting
from an unexpected once and for all marginal increase in wages. The long-run one, on the other
hand, will result from the behavior of an agent aged 40 that already beneﬁted from wage increases
11Figure 5: Uncompensated and compensated labor supply elasticities
throughout his whole life cycle. The left part of Figure 5 shows uncompensated elasticities, i.e. the
relative changes in labor supply resulting from a marginal increase in wages. At young ages, increas-
ing wages leads to a decrease in labor supply. Hence, the income effect dominates the substitution
effect. Note that the very low values and the steep increase at the beginning of the life cycle are due
to the fact that a major part of the population in that cohort is liquidity constrained. Liquidity con-
straints force individuals to increase their hours worked. Consequently, a rise in wages may loosen
liquidity constraints and in turn make labor supply of liquidity constrained agents decline. Hence,
the income effect is much stronger for these cohorts. Looking at later ages in life, from a cross sec-
tional perspective, individuals will tend to increase their labor supply, since they can only beneﬁtf o r
a shorter period from the increase in wages and therefore will try to make the most out of it. Taking
a look at the individual life-cycle, however, individuals will start saving more at younger ages. This
causes an additional income effect at later periods in life which leads to a declining labor supply elas-
ticity throughout the working period. The compensated elasticities, i.e. where additional lump-sum
transfers neutralize the income effect of the initial wage increase, always have to be positive in our
model. In addition, since households have to work a lot in order to be able to form both life-cycle
and precautionary savings due to labor productivity and disability risk, elasticities are much lower
at the beginning of the working phase than towards the end. Overall, the short-run elasticities are
close to the values reported in Fenge, Übelmesser and Werding (2006) for different age groups.
The German pension system actually has two normal retirement ages, i.e. the ﬁrst age at which one
will receive the full pension payment without adjustment. The regular normal retirement age is 65.
However, a reduced age of 63 applies to both disability pensioners and the unemployed. Since we
explicitly account for disability risk, normal retirement age is set to 63 for these individuals. Note
that in consequence, a disabled worker who has to retire before age 60, will have his earning points
adjusted as if he had worked until age 60, but will also face an adjustment factor of (63 − 60) · 3.6 =
10.8 percent. In addition, we interpret our worst labor market shock as old-age unemployment and
let individuals with this shock also retire with a normal retirement of 63. Furthermore, the age at
12which individuals can make their ﬁrst retirement choice differs across different groups. Whereas
disabled individuals always retire immediately, the unemployed may retire from age 60 onwards
while regular workers may start retiring from 63. Figure 6 summarizes the factors by which pensions
will be adjusted for different types of retirees.
Figure 6: Adjustment factors by groups of pensioners
As mentioned above, psychological costs of working ν in our model depend on the own labor mar-
ket status. With these cost parameters, we target a good match of the retirement pattern currently
observed in Germany. Nevertheless, we also aim at minimizing the inﬂuence of this (exogenous) pa-
rameter on the decision to retire. Hence, we let ν have an expected value of 1.17 percent, a standard
deviation of 1.27 percent and assume a correlation between ν and ηj of −0.9, i.e. the higher labor
market income, the lower utility costs from working. This results in the retirement pattern reported
in the left part of Figure 7. Due to the very detailed modeling of the German pension law, we ﬁnd
a good match of the model generated retirement pattern with German data. Obviously, workers re-
tiring before age 60 have to be disabled. After age 60 we see three major peaks at ages 60, 63 and
65. The ﬁrst of these is due to retirement of the unemployed. The second peak, on the other hand, is
formed by individuals having had a lot of luck during their time of work and having accumulated a
lot of assets and earnings points. Since those will not work anymore due to income effects, they may
retire early. The last peak captures all regular old-age retirees. The right part of Figure 7 shows the re-
tirement pattern for individuals of different skill classes. Since the risk of getting disabled decreases
with skill level, the lower skilled tend to retire earlier than the higher skilled.
3.5 Technology
IdW (2009) reports a wage share in production of 65.2 percent for Germany in 2008. Since the wage
share in our model is given by 1 −  ,w es e t  at 0.35. In addition, we choose a value of 1.3 for
the technology parameter θ in order to normalize the wage rate for effective labor to 1. We let the
depreciation rate δk on capital be 4.2 percent. This guarantees investment to amount to 20.3 percent
of GDP, which is slightly higher than the value of 19.3 reported in IdW (2009) for Germany. Finally,
we assume a growth rate of 1.3 percent for individual time endowment, which is in line with the long
run average growth rate for Germany reported in Erber and Fritsche (2009).
13Figure 7: Retirement pattern in model and data
∗Source: DRV (2010). Own calculations for year 2009.
3.6 Government policy
The tax system Government tax policy in our model reﬂects quite well the German tax system.
Speciﬁcally, we set the debt to output ratio at 60 percent and ﬁx the consumption tax rate at 17
percent, which guarantees a consumption tax revenue to output share of 9.9 percent. This share is
slightly lower than the value of 10.7 percent reported in IdW (2009). We apply the German income
tax code of the year 2005 to labor and pension income, the marginal tax rate schedule of which is
displayed in Figure 8. In addition we tax returns from savings linearly at the rate 26.4 percent. This
Figure 8: Marginal tax rates for labor and pension income
reﬂects the recent reform of capital income taxation in Germany. Finally, we set the corporate tax rate
τk at 15 percent which yields a revenue to output ratio of 3 percent that is slightly higher than the
14value of 2.1 percent reported in IdW (2009).
The pension system A much more detailed focus lies on the pension system, since this is the one
this paper is interested in. As already mentioned above, we set normal retirement ages, ages of
ﬁrst retirement choice and the adjustment factor for early retirement according to German pension
law. We also use realistic disability risk processes derived from Hagen et al. (2010). Finally we
set the pension contribution rate to 19.9 percent, which since 2007 is the legal contribution rate in
Germany. This leads us to a gross replacement rate of 48 percent, which is close to the one reported
for Germany in OECD (2009), and an overall amount of pension payments of 12 percent of GDP.
Thereby, 1.5 percent of GDP are spent on disability pensions, a value slightly higher than the amount
of 0.9 percent reported for Germany by IdW (2009). As already discussed before, changes in the
actual pension amount are derived from the evolution of aggregate household income corrected for
changes in the old age dependency ratio.
3.7 The baseline path
Except for the demographic projections, all the ﬁgures above were calculated to calibrate our base
year 2008. Table 3 again summarizes our calibrated parameters and the respective calibration targets.
H o w e v e r ,s i n c ew ea s s u m ead e m o g r a p h i ct r a n s i t i o n ,w en e e dac o m p l e t eb a s e l i n es c e n a r i of r o m
2008 to a long-run equilibrium as basis for our computational experiment. In order to calculate this
baseline path, we have to make some speciﬁc assumptions about future public policy. We therefore
consider three reform packages already initiated by the German government:
1. "Retirement with 67": This reform package successively increases normal retirement ages of the
cohorts born 1947 and later from 65 to 67 and the reduced age from 63 to 65.
2. "Front-loaded taxation of pension beneﬁts:" In 2005, the Government passed a law on the taxation
of pension beneﬁts. As a consequence, in 2008, 66 percent of pension contributions are exempt
fromtax, while 56percentofreceivedpensionpaymentshave tobetaxed. Theseratesgradually
increase over time until in 2040, pension contributions are completely deductible and beneﬁts
are fully taxed.
3. "Targets for the pension contribution rate:" For the evolvement of the pension contribution rate,
the government has issued the targets of 20 percent for 2020 and 22 percent for 2030. There are
several factors determining the size of pension payments, i.e. the actual pension amount. On
the one hand, a rising old age dependency ratio leads to a cut in beneﬁts, on the other hand,
the actual pension amount grows at the same rate as wages. This will, however, not be enough
in our model. Consequently, we additionally adjust the actual pension amount in each year
between 2008 and 2030 to match the Government’s targets.
Table 4 reports our simulated baseline path from 2008 until 2060. There are two main driving forces
determining these results. On the one hand, the strong increase in the old age dependency ratio in-
duced by a rise in longevity and low fertility rates causes a reduction in pension beneﬁt levels. On
the other hand, the reform "Retirement with 67" forces individuals to work longer. In consequence,
employment as well as aggregate savings and therefore capital strongly increase. Since the latter
outweighs the former, wages increase throughout the transition while the interest rate falls. Due
15Table 3: Calibration targets
Parameter Value Target
Demographics
Population growth nt Population projections by SB (2009)
Survival probabilities ψj Bomsdorf (2003), SB(2009),
von Gaudecker and Scholz (2007)
Skill distribution  s estimated from SOEP data
Labor productivity and disability risk
Labor productivity ej,ηj estimated from SOEP data
Disability risk πd
j Hagen et al. (2010)
Time loss from disability h 0.80 welfare loss from disability
Preferences and retirement
Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution γ 0.50 ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu and Kitao (2009)
Intra-temporal elasticity of substitution ρ 0.60 labor supply elasticities
Leisure preference α 1.60 average hours worked 0.4
Time discount factor β 0.985 capital output ratio 3.5
psychological costs of working ν retirement pattern
Technology and government policy
Capital share in production   0.35 IdW (2009)
Technology parameter θ wage rate for effective labor of 1
Depreciation of capital δk 0.042 investment to GDP ratio 19.3%
Debt to GDP ratio 0.60 target value issued by government
Consumption tax rate τc 0.17 revenue to output share 10.7%
Income tax code German tax law
Corporate tax rate τk 0.15 revenue to output share 2.1%
Technological progress κ 0.013 Erber and Fritsche (2009)
Pension system design German pension law
to population ageing the size of the work force decreases much faster than the size of the overall
population. In addition, public goods provision is constant per capita. Consequently, revenues from
income taxation decline much faster than public expenditure which results in increasing consump-
tion taxes. The policy reform "Retirement with 67" obviously causes average retirement age to rise
throughoutthe transition. In 2060 this age is 2.4 yearshigher than in 2008, which is more than the two
year increase in normal retirement age. This further rise is mainly due to the reduction in pension
beneﬁts resulting from population ageing, see row "Replacement rate".6 Although the replacement
rate declines throughout the transition, the budget of the pension system has to be enlarged. This
is because the cut in replacement rates can not completely absorb the rising expenditure resulting
from population ageing. Consequently, the pension contribution rate has to be successively adjusted
until it reaches a value of 25.7 percent in 2060. Note that due to the additional reduction in pension
beneﬁts we are nearly able to match the targets for the contribution rate of 20 percent in 2020 and 22
percent in 2030 issued by the German government.
6 Unlike in Heijdra and Romp (2009), population ageing per se does not cause increases in mean retirement in our model
since we abstract from annuity markets. As shown in Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil (2010), the effect of decreasing mortality
rates on the timing of retirement is ambiguous when there are unintended bequests.
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Year 2008 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Macroeconomic aggregates
Employment 100.0 109.7 114.3 119.6 127.7 135.9
Capital 100.0 118.3 131.0 139.1 147.1 156.5
Prices
Wage 100.0 102.7 104.9 105.4 105.1 105.1
Interest rate 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.2
Consumption tax rate 17.0 20.1 22.4 24.3 25.2 25.3
Pension system
Mean retirement age 59.8 60.9 62.5 61.9 62.2 62.2
Replacement rate 48.0 43.9 41.0 39.6 39.5 39.2
Expenditure (in % of GDP) 12.0 12.5 13.5 14.8 15.2 15.5
Contribution rate 19.9 20.6 22.5 24.6 25.2 25.7
Poverty measures
Elderly poverty rate 5.0 7.9 10.0 10.6 10.1 9.0
Elderly poverty risk 17.4 19.5 20.2 20.6 20.8 20.4
Finally, we report some poverty measures amongst the elderly in our baseline scenario. According
to SVR (2007), a household is considered to be poor if his after tax income lies below 40 percent
of the median income in the population. In addition, according to the deﬁnition of the European
Union, one is at risk of poverty, if income is not higher than 60 percent of median income. In the last
part of Table 4, we therefore report poverty rates and rates of poverty risk for pensioners. We ﬁnd
that about 5 percent of retirees are poor and 17.4 are at the risk of being so. The main reason why
this numbers are higher than the 2.4 percent and 15.0 percent, reported for Germany in SVR (2007),
is that we do not account for a social protection system. An individual living on social assistance
receives about 54 percent of median income as beneﬁts, hence, could not be accounted for as poor in
Germany. Nevertheless, we think that these two measures still are a good indicator for the evolution
of old-age income in our model. Obviously, since the replacement rate of the pension systemdeclines
by about 9 percent throughout the transition, the elderly become increasingly poor. Consequently,
the poverty rate more than doubles until 2040. These projections give rise to some very important
questions: Is our fully earnings related pension system really able to deal with all the problems
arising from both population ageing and our future pension reform packages? Would a (at least
partly) progressive system do better or would it just lead to efﬁciency losses due to labor supply
distortions? The following sections aim at addressing this issue.
4 Simulation results
The remainder of this paper will mainly focus on the optimal progressivity of the pension system.
In order to quantify the macroeconomic, welfare and efﬁciency effects of progressive pension ar-
rangements, we change in year 2009 the parameter λ – in some reforms we also alter μ –i nt h e
accumulation equation for earning points epj+1 and compute a new "reform path" up to the long-run
17equilibrium. In the ﬁrst subsection we explain how welfare and efﬁciency effects are computed given
this reform path. The next part considers a rather extreme scenario, namely the change from a fully
earnings related to a fully ﬂat pension system. Precisely because this reform is so drastic, it is the
best one to show all the economic consequences of pension progression. A next step will then be to
determining the optimal degree of progression in the pension system and examine the sensitivity of
our result with respect to some central model assumptions. A ﬁnal side note will shed light on the
consequences of changes in the system size rather than its progression.
4.1 Computation of welfare and efﬁciency effects
The concept we apply to quantify welfare effects is compensating variation à la Hicks. Due to the
homogeneity of our utility function,
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holds for any cj, j and φ. In consequence, since utility is additively separable with respect to time,
if consumption and leisure were simultaneously increased by the factor 1 + φ at any age, life-time
utility would increase by the factor (1 + φ)
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γ. With this considerations lets again turn to our sim-
ulation model. Assume an individual at state zj had utility Vb(zj) in the baseline path and Vr(zj) in
the reform path. The compensating variation between the baseline and the reform scenario for the









φ then indicates the percentage change in both consumption and leisure individual zj would require
in the baseline path in order to be as well of as in the reform scenario. The other way round we may
say that an individual is φ better (or worse) off in terms of resources in the reform path than in the
baseline scenario. If φ > 0, the reform is therefore welfare improving for this individual and vice
versa.
A special rule applies to individual not having entered their economically relevant phase of life in
2008 (the so-called future generations), the year before we conduct our pension reforms. We evaluate
their utility behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, i.e. from an ex-ante perspective where neither
their skill level nor any labor market shock has been revealed. The concept ofcompensating variation
thereby applies likewise.
Figure 9 shows the possible individual welfare and aggregate efﬁciency consequences resulting from
a generic reform experiment. For the sake of simplicity, we only consider a representative individual
for each cohort. The numbers on the abscissa denote birth years of different cohorts. Since house-
holds become economically active at age 20, the last cohort that was already participating in markets
in year 2008 was born in 1988. This point is indicated by the intersection of the two axes. Con-
sequently, when talking about future generations in the following, we mean all cohorts born after
1989.
The solid line in Figure 9 indicates cohort-speciﬁc welfare consequences. As can be seen, the consid-
eredreformredistributesfrom currentlyliving to futurecohorts. In orderto isolatethe pureefﬁciency
effects of the reform, we apply the hypothetical concept of a Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority
18Figure 9: Generic welfare consequences of a reform
(LSRA) used by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) in a separate simulation. The LSRA thereby proceeds
as follows: to all generations already being economically active in 2008 it pays lump-sum transfers
or levies lump-sum taxes in order to make them as well off in the reform path than in the baseline
path. Consequently their compensating variation amounts to zero. Having done that, the LSRA
might have run into debt or build up some assets. It now redistributes this debt or assets across all
future generationsin a way that theyall face the same compensating variation, confer the dashed line
in Figure 9. This variation can be interpreted as a measure of efﬁciency. Consequently, if the vari-
ation is greater than zero, the reform is Pareto improving after compensation and vice versa. With
this concepts in hand, we can now proceed to our simulation results and the question of optimal
progressivity of the pension system.
4.2 Flat pensions
In this section, we will show some detailed simulation results coming from the transition towards
a fully ﬂat pension system, i.e. we set λ = 1 from year 2009 onwards. The introduction of ﬂat
pensions comes with two reverse effects. On the one hand, whereas under the earnings related
system a part of pension contributions was recognized as implicit savings, with ﬂat pensions the
complete contributions works as implicit tax, see below for a much more detailed analysis. Hence,
the change to a ﬂat pension beneﬁt system increases labor supply distortions. On the other hand, a
non-earnings-related pension also provides insurance against labor market risk.
Macroeconomic implications At ﬁrst we want to take a look at the macroeconomic implications of our
pension reform. Remember that the reform is introduced in year 2009. To clarify the impact of the
reform on factor markets, Figure 10 compares in the upper part the evolution of employment and
capital in the baseline simulation (solid line) and the reform scenario (dashed line). Since λ changes
from 0 to a value of 1 immediately in year 2009, suddenly any worker accumulates one earning
point per year and in consequence the whole contribution to the pension system is perceived as a
19Figure 10: Factor markets before and after the reform
tax. This severely distorts employment downwards. Note that the change in the tax structure takes
place in the reform year 2009 and is kept once and for all. Therefore, employment jumps in this
year and then moves on in parallel with the baseline employment path. The decline in household
labor supply comes along with a sharp increase in wages and a drop in interest rates. In opposite
to employment, capital usually needs a longer time to adjust. Since by the drop in employment
individual income shrinks, capital will successively decline in the long run, as people tend to save
less on average. Obviously, individuals of different labor market status will react differently to this
reform. A detailed analysis will clarify this later on. With the decline in capital and the following
reduction in individual assets, factor markets again have to adjust and therefore wages decline and
interest rates increase with time. Interestingly, the reduction in household asset supply outweighs
the effects of employment decreases, which causes wages to be lower in the long run than in the
baseline scenario.
Another interesting point to look at is the government sector analyzed in Figure 11. Since employ-
mentdropssharplyintheshort-run,output,householdincomeandthereforeaggregateconsumption
fall. The long-run decline in capital causes consumption in the baseline and the reform scenario to
even diverge further. As government expenditure is held ﬁx per capita and not in relation to output,
the consumption tax rate has to increase in order to balance the tax system’s budget. In the pension
20Figure 11: Consumption ans government sector before and after the reform
system, the actual pension amount, i.e. the monetary value of one earning point, is coupled with the
evolution of lagged aggregate household income. Consequently, changes in this amount can ﬁrst be
seen in year 2010, where it decreases sharply induced by the fall in employment and the resulting
change in household income. For the pension contribution rate, we therefore observe a sharp in-
crease in 2009 due to the reduction in the pension contribution base paired with a reverse movement
in 2010 resulting from the decrease in pension payments. In the long-run, the decline in wages nar-
rows both the contribution base and pension expenditure. However, the former effects tends to be
stronger than the latter, which is why the pension contribution rate again increases compared to the
baseline scenario.
Implicit taxes and inequality So far, we only looked at the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates
over time. However, we are also interested in the intra- and intergenerational welfare consequences
of the ﬂat pension reform. To understand these, we have to further examine the implicit tax and
savings structure of the German pension system. Since pensions are earnings related in the base-
line path, only a part of pension contributions is perceived as tax by individuals. The other part
corresponds to implicit savings in the system. The implicit savings share can be computed from
comparing the change in pension contributions implied by a marginal increase in labor supply at a
21speciﬁc age with the resulting increase in the present value of pension beneﬁts, see Fehr and Kinder-
mann (2010) for further details on the computation. Since earning points do not pay any interest, it
is clear that the savings share must be lower at the beginning of the working life than shortly before
retirement. However, due to the perfect tax beneﬁt linkage, the share is the same for any individual
of a cohort irrespective of his income. Figure 12 shows implicit tax and savings share over the life
cycle in our model. At the beginning of the life-cycle the tax share amounts to roughly 75 percent
Figure 12: Implicit tax and savings over the life-cycle
of the contribution. Throughout the working phase it successively increases. Interestingly, the tax
share even turns negative shortly before retirement. During this time, individuals actually receive a
savings subsidy from the pension system. Hence, contributions are very valuable during that time.
This implicit tax structure will have a signiﬁcant impact on individual welfare for different cohorts,
see below.
Another important thing to look at, in order to understand intra-generational redistribution induced
by the introduction of ﬂat pensions, is inequality measures. Therefore, Figure 13 shows on the left
hand side the evolution of poverty rates and poverty risk among the elderly generations. Obviously,
since due to the reform everyone will receive the same pension independent of his former labor
market income, our reform induces a strong redistribution in income from the richer to the poorer.
In consequence of that, both the poverty rate and poverty risk of the elderly decreases dramatically
from the introduction of ﬂat pensions. However, the reform has another important effect. Since
individuals that were facing bad labor market shocks now in proportion receive very high pension
payments while individuals with high income get a relative low pension, agents have to adjust their
savings to compensate for possible income gains or losses at retirement. Therefore, the gap in asset
holdings between the richer and the poorer will increase from the reform. This can be seen from the
right hand side of Figure 13 showing the evolution of the Gini coefﬁcient for assets over time.
Welfare and efﬁciency With the above discussion in mind, we can now turn to the welfare effects of
our reform. Therefore Table 5 summarizes welfare consequences measured in compensating vari-
ation for different cohorts. For agents already taking economic decisions in the reform year, we
22Figure 13: Poverty measures on the baseline and the reform path
disentangle welfare effects in several ways. The left part of the Table reports for agents already re-
tired in the reform year average welfare changes by their status in the pension system, i.e. regular
or disability pensioner. The working cohorts are, beneath explicitly accounting for welfare of the
disabled, grouped by their productivity level. We thereby merge the lower one sixth and the higher
Table 5: Welfare effects of ﬂat pensions∗
Birth Age in without LSRA with
year 2009 by status by skill level LSRA
Retirees regular disab. low middle high
1920 89 -2.48 -2.46 -2.56 -2.52 -2.34 0.00
1940 69 -2.55 -2.72 -2.70 -2.65 -2.45 0.00
Workers low medium high disab. low middle high
1960 49 6.01 -0.39 -1.76 -3.20 -0.37 0.21 0.57 0.00
1980 29 6.69 -0.16 -1.31 – 0.15 0.99 1.07 0.00
Future Generations
2000 9 0.62 -1.03
2020 – 0.11 -1.03
2040 – -0.03 -1.03
2060 – -0.08 -1.03
∗In percent of initial resources.
one sixth of the overall productivity distribution in the states "low" and "high". The remaining part
23of the distribution is captured in state "medium".7 In the right part of the table, we report average
welfare changes by skill class. For future generations, we apply the concept of ex ante welfare and
therefore only report one aggregate number per cohort. The ﬁrst two columns indicate birth year
of the respective cohorts and their age in the reform year 2009. Retirees face tremendous welfare
losses from the reform. These are due to the strong increase in consumption taxes resulting from a
decline in employment and the downward adjustment of the actual pension amount from year 2010
onwards. Obviously, the younger the cohort, the higher welfare losses, since consumption taxes rise
stronger over times. For the working cohorts in the reform year, welfare effects are not so clear-cut.
Noticeably, welfare changes decrease with age. This is a result of the implicit tax structure of the
pension system discussed above. As older individuals were facing a very high savings share in pen-
sion contributions, they lose most when all contributions are turned into taxes by the introduction
of ﬂat pensions. However, intra-generational redistribution effects are even more interesting. What
can be seen immediately is the redistribution from the richer towards the poorer induced by the pro-
gressive pension formula. This causes welfare of individuals in the bottom one sixth of the income
distribution to rise by up to 6.7 percent, while average welfare especially of the highest one sixth of
the productivity distribution decreases. An interesting effect can be seen when looking at the column
"disab." denoting welfare changes of disabled agents. Like old-age pensioners, these individuals
suffer from the increase in consumption taxes and the cut in the actual pension amount in the future.
The right panel of Table 5 indicates welfare changes for different skill levels. Among the elderly, the
numbers are quite similar to the left panel. However, for working individuals, the lower educated
are worse off from the reform than the higher skilled. This interesting result is due to two things:
ﬁrst, the income risk process accounts for a much larger fraction of heterogeneity in incomes than
the distribution of skills. Second, and more important, disability risk is highest among individuals of
low skills. Since disability pensioners loose from the reform, the average welfare change in this class
is lowest and might even turn negative.
The short-run future generations partly gain from the introduction of ﬂat pensions. This is mainly
due to the sharp increase in wages and the insurance provision through the pension system out-
weighing the losses from labor market distortions. However, through time welfare decreases, since
individual assets and therefore accidental bequests decline, which redistributes towards the earlier
cohorts.
Finally, lets turn to welfare effects after LSRA compensation payments. As mentioned above, the
LSRA makes all existing cohorts as well off as in the benchmark simulation and redistributes re-
sources across future generations to make them all face the same welfare changes. The evolution of
welfare after compensation is depicted in the right part of Table 5. We ﬁnd that the reform induces
losses for any future generation of about one percent of initial resources. The introduction of ﬂat
pensions comes along with two major efﬁciency consequences: on the one hand, insurance provision
against labor market risk causes efﬁciency to rise while, on the other hand, increasing labor mar-
ket distortions reduce it. We ﬁnd in this reform scenario that the latter outweighs the former and
therefore the introduction of completely ﬂat pension beneﬁts is Pareto inferior.
7 We chose exactly this partition of the work force due to computational reasons.
244.3 Optimal progressivity of the pension system
While it turned out in the previous subsection that a completely ﬂat beneﬁts y s t e mw o u l dr e d u c e
aggregate efﬁciency, it is not clear yet, whether a partly progressive pension system will also lead to
efﬁciency losses. Having in mind that usually labor market distortions rise quadratically in tax rates,
it might be that there is a combination of ﬂat and earnings-related pensions that improves efﬁciency.
The aim of this section is to clarify whether there is an optimal mix of ﬂat and earnings-related pen-
sions in our simulation model that improves aggregate efﬁciency. Therefore, Table 6 shows aggregate
efﬁciency gains and losses for different choices of λ. This table reveals an interesting insight into the
Table 6: Efﬁciency effects of different values for λ∗
λ 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
φ 0.00 0.10 0.48 0.31 -0.03 -1.03
∗In percent of initial resources.
opponent efﬁciency effects of pension progressivity. With an increasing ﬂat pillar in the pension sys-
tem, obviously both insurance provision and labor market distortions rise. However, at lower values
of λ, the insurance effect clearly dominates labor supply distortions. Nevertheless, around a value
of 40 percent, efﬁciency again starts to decline as labor supply distortions start to outweigh the in-
surance effects. Finally, a pension system in which 80 percent of pension payments are not related to
earnings generates efﬁciency losses. As can be seen from the above table, we ﬁnd a pension system
with a 40 percent ﬂat and a 60 percent earnings related pension to be optimal in our model.
Insurance provision versus labor market distortions As stated above, the efﬁciency gains arising from
increasing the progressivity of the pension system are due to positive insurance and negative distor-
tion effects. In order to disentangle the impact of these two, Table 7 reports welfare and efﬁciency
effects in alternative model speciﬁcations. In the upper left panel, we show the effects of introducing
the optimal pension system (i.e. λ = 0.4) in the regular setup used in the previous section.8 Since the
same driving forces like in the fully ﬂat pension reform are at work in this case, welfare results are
of same quality than those reported in Table 5, but less intense. On the right hand side, we assume
labor supply to be ﬁxed at the value of 0.4, i.e. the target value for average hours worked. In order to
receive the same capital to output ratio in 2008, we have to adapt the time discount factor β and set
it at 0.991. In the case of completely inelastic labor supply, there obviously is no employment effect
in 2009, when the reform takes place. In consequence, the consumption tax rate as well as the actual
pension amount remain nearly unaltered compared to the baseline scenario. Hence, welfare changes
of already retired individuals (including the disabled) are nearly zero. Welfare for the working and
future cohorts, on the other hand, is signiﬁcantly higher than in the benchmark scenario, since labor
supply distortions are absent. In total, converting 40 percent of the pension systeminto a ﬂat pension
pillar comes with an efﬁciency effect of 2.17 percent of initial resources, which reﬂects the gains from
insurance provision against labor market risk.
8 We will refer to this setup as our benchmark calibration.
25Table 7: Welfare and efﬁciency of the mixed pension scheme (λ = 0.4)∗
Birth Age in without LSRA with without LSRA with
year 2009 by status LSRA by status LSRA
Benchmark calibration Fixed labor supply (β = 0.991)
Retirees regular disab. regular disab.
1920 89 -1.00 -1.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
1940 69 -1.01 -1.08 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.00
Workers low medium high disab. low medium high disab.
1960 49 2.15 -0.13 -0.71 -1.24 0.00 4.01 0.27 -0.50 -0.08 0.00
1980 29 3.06 -0.06 -0.49 – 0.00 5.85 0.69 -0.35 – 0.00
Future Gen.
2000 9 0.59 0.48 1.84 2.17
2020 – 0.38 0.48 1.63 2.17
2040 – 0.30 0.48 1.35 2.17
2060 – 0.27 0.48 1.22 2.17
Risk neutral individuals (β = 0.990) High risk aversion (β = 0.985)
Retirees regular disab. regular disab.
1920 89 -0.91 -0.91 0.00 -1.19 -1.19 0.00
1940 69 -0.91 -0.97 0.00 -1.20 -1.28 0.00
Workers low medium high disab. low medium high disab.
1960 49 1.99 -0.13 -0.71 -1.16 0.00 2.24 -0.17 -0.78 -1.43 0.00
1980 29 1.65 -0.11 -0.57 – 0.00 4.81 0.29 -0.44 – 0.00
Future Gen.
2000 9 -0.11 -0.56 2.65 2.45
2020 – -0.28 -0.56 2.55 2.45
2040 – -0.34 -0.56 2.45 2.45
2060 – -0.35 -0.56 2.42 2.45
∗In percent of initial resources.
The third speciﬁcation reported in the lower left part of Table 7 is a scenario in which individuals are
completely risk neutral. We therefore assume preferences to be of Epstein and Zin (1991) type and set
risk aversion to zero. Note that in our benchmark calibration, the CES utility function implies a risk
aversion of2. Theresulting welfare and efﬁciency effectsare depictedin the lowerpart ofthetable. In
the case of risk neutral individuals, obviously there are only labor supply distortions but no positive
insurance effects. Consequently, welfare effects for the generationsin the reform year are very similar
to those in the upper left panel of the table, since individuals are confronted with a similar change
in consumption taxes, actual pension amount and redistribution. The lack of gains from insurance
provision can be seen best from the welfare losses of future generations. The decrease in welfare due
to declining bequests, however, is still present. Overall, we ﬁnd an efﬁciency loss of 0.56 percent of
initial resources. Since especially the scenario where labor supply is ﬁxed exhibits some systemic
changes compared to the benchmark scenario, efﬁciency gains and losses of the two scenarios cannot
26just be added up. However, these sensitivity results give an insight into the model dynamics and
emphasize the role of insurance provision and labor supply distortions. Finally, the lower right
part assumes a coefﬁcient of risk aversion of 4, which is still in the range of plausible values.9 Of
course now, we can see the opposite compared to the previous simulation. Therefore, future cohorts
will value the insurance provision by the pension system much stronger, so that welfare gains are
much higher especially in the long-run compared to the benchmark calibration. As a consequence,
aggregate efﬁciency increases from 0.48 to 2.45 percent of aggregate resources. Since our benchmark
assumptionaboutriskaversion seemsrathermodest,thisresultstronglysupportsa moreprogressive
pension system.
Time shocks for the disabled As already mentioned in the calibration section, our choice of h is quite
conservative. To clarify to which extendthis time cost inﬂuences our simulation results, we also ran a
simulation in which we introduced a 40 percent ﬂat pillar into the pension system an let h = 0.6. The
respective efﬁciency gain was 0.70. This is due to the fact that in the long run, disability pensioners
gain from redistribution. These gains are obviously higher the higher utility losses from disability,
since marginal utility of consumption increases with h. However, the magnitude of this inﬂuence is
rather small.
4.4 A note on the optimal system size
Finally, we want to use our model to make a short statement on the optimal size of the pension
system. Since ourdisability pensionsystemis directly coupledwithregular old-agepensions,it is not
surprising that a complete privatization would lead to strong efﬁciency losses in absence of private
disability insurance. Consequently, we only simulate slight changes in the pension size parameter μ
from 2009 onwards. The results are shown in Table 8. In addition to the effects from the disability
Table 8: The size of the system∗
μ 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20
φ -0.34 -0.14 0.00 0.12 0.00
∗In percent of initial resources.
insurance, altering the size of a paygo pension system comes along with different effects, a detail
analysis of which can e.g. be found in Fehr, Habermann and Kindermann (2008). Summing up their
arguments, the move towards a more funded system induces the following effects:
1. The switch from a front- to a back-loaded taxation resulting from the reduction in pension
contributions enforces labor market distortions but, under a progressive tax system, increases
insurance provision against labor market risk.
2. The loss of annuitization eliminates longevity insurance but also increases accidental bequests.
9 Typically, values between 1 and 5 are perceived as reasonable in the literature, see Cecchetti et al. (2000, p.792) for a
discussion.
273. The abolition of mandatory savings relaxes liquidity constraints at the beginning of the life-
cycle.
As a result of these effects, Fehr et al. (2008) ﬁnd an efﬁciency loss from the complete privatization
of the German pension system of about 0.6 percent of initial resources. In our present model, the
pension system has one additional positive feature, namely it cares for the sustenance of the dis-
abled. Hence, we would expect efﬁciency losses from pension privatization to be even stronger in
our model. Table 8 supports this view. It shows that the current size of the pension system in Ger-
many is close to optimal. An increase of 10 percent only comes at very small efﬁciency gains while
a small reduction in size already leads to a decline in aggregate efﬁciency. Summing up, our results
indicate the fact that the change towards a more progressive pension system and no reduction in its
size seems to be the optimal choice for the German economy.
5 Discussion
This paper aims at determining the optimal progressivity of the pension system under the problem
of population ageing. In order to clarify this question, we construct a model of overlapping gener-
ations which features realistic demographic projections, labor income, longevity and disability risk
and endogenous labor supply at both the intensive and the extensive margin. We calibrate our base
year to the German economy and consider recent pension and tax reforms in our baseline path. In
this setup, we study the transition from the German fully earnings related pension regime towards
systems with a ﬂat pillar. We ﬁnd for our most preferred parametrization that a pension system con-
sisting of 40 percent ﬂat and 60 percent earning related beneﬁts is optimal for the German economy,
since the positive insurance effect in this setupis strongerthan theefﬁciency lossesfrom labor supply
distortions. Furthermore, a reduction in size only comes at efﬁciency costs.
The demand for more progressivity in the pension system is not new to the literature on simulated
overlapping generations models. Fehr and Habermann (2008) already quantify the efﬁciency effects
of progressive pension arrangements in an overlapping generations model. However, their ﬁndings
and argumentation differ substantially from the present paper. Since their model does not feature
changes in the population structure and takes the date of retirement as given, they tend to ﬁnd a
higher progressivity to be optimal especially in the case without basic allowances. The increasing
burden from the rise in the old age dependency ratio in our model however causes pension contri-
butions to become increasingly distortive even in a perfectly earnings related setup. Consequently,
rising distortions from a reduction in this linkage weigh much stronger and we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly
lower degree of progressivity to be optimal in terms of aggregate efﬁciency. Furthermore, a detailed
description of income risk factors and exit pathways to retirement makes the present model much
more reliable in terms of the quantiﬁcation of insurance and distortion effects.
In our model every individual that receives a disability shock will be eligible to disability insurance
beneﬁts. Yet, one might argue that in reality there is a serious information problem which not only
causes healthy individuals to get access to disability pensions but also some disabled to be rejected.
This problem is mainly discussed in the theoretical and empirical literature, see e.g. Diamond and
Sheshinski (1995) or Duggan, Singleton and Song (2007). However, since the focus of this paper does
not lie on disability risk and this type of uncertainty is not the major source of income risk, including
such information constraints would only increase computational time but is very unlikely to reveal
28new insights. Furthermore,we completely neglectedmeans-testedminimum income beneﬁts. At the
moment, only about 2.5 percent of retirees receives these beneﬁts. However, since old-age poverty
is expected to rise substantially in the future, this fraction would increase signiﬁcantly. Obviously,
a means-tested minimum income guarantee also provides insurance against labor market risk and
old-age poverty. Hence, it might be that the efﬁciency gains from insurance are damped when such
beneﬁts are incorporated. Nevertheless, means-tested minimum income guarantees also severely
distort old-age savings. Hence, considering such an income guarantee should be left to future re-
search.
A Technical appendix
In this appendix we want to give a more equation based deﬁnition of our model and deﬁne what an
equilibrium path is.
A.1 Detailed formulation of the household problem
In order to state the household optimization problem in a recursive fashion, we ﬁrst want to deﬁne
in detail what the household state vector is.
Deﬁnition 1 (Household state vector) Let
z =( j,s,a,ep,η,d,o) ∈Z= J×S×A×P×E×D×R
where J = {1,2,...,J}, S = {1,2,... ,S}, A =[ 0,∞], P =[ 0,∞], E =[ −∞,∞], D = {0,1},a n d
R = {0,1}. Then z completely describes the individual state of a household. In the following we will use the
abbreviation
zj =( s,a,ep,η,d,o)
for the sake of simplicity.
With this deﬁnition of the household state, we can now turn to the description of the household op-
timization problem. We deﬁne this problem separately for working and retired agents. The decision
problem of an individual with state zj =( s,aj,epj,ηj,0,0) at age j and time t, i.e. an individual that




















with the terminal condition Vt(zJ+1)=0, ∀t. The three different combinations for zj+1 deﬁne the
states in which the agent is still working in the next period, in which he chooses to retire and in
which he receives a disability shock, i.e.
zw
j+1 =( s,aj+1,epj+1,ηj+1,0,0) , zr
j+1 =( s,aj+1,epj+1,0,0,1) and zd
j+1 =( s,aj+1,epj+1,0,1,1).
29The continuous state variables a,ep and η are subject to the following laws of motions: assets evolve
according to
aj+1 =( 1+ rt)aj + y + b − τty − Tt(y,0,rtaj) − (1+ τc,t)c,
with labor income y = wtej(1 −  )10, accidental bequests b, the pension contribution rate τt,t h et a x
schedule Tt(·) and the consumption tax rate τc,t. As already mentioned above, individuals accumu-
late earning points according to the formula







with the economy wide average labor income ¯ yt at time t. Finally, log labor productivity shock
evolves according to the AR(1) process
ηj+1 =  ηj + ε with ε ∼ N(0,σ2
ε ).
According to this process, we can calculate the distribution function π(·|·,·) of ηj+1 conditional on
the realization ηj and the individual skill level s. Note that the labor productivity shock doesnot play
a role for retired agents. Hence, we set ηj to zero when an agent chooses to retire.
An important factor for calculating expected future utility is the retirement decision in the next pe-
riod oj+1. Note that the retirement decision is made after all current shocks are revealed, i.e. when
disability status and labor productivity are known. The individual then makes a retirement decision
via comparing utilities from working for another period oj+1 = 0 and switching to the state of a






0o t h e r w i s e .
For the already retired, the optimization problem is much simpler. Since they do not work anymore,







where   = 1 for old-age and   = h for disability pensioners. Next periods state vector is then given
by
zj+1 =( s,aj+1,epj,0,dj,1),
where assets evolve according to




epj × APAt if oj = 1a n d
0o t h e r w i s e
10 Thereby, ej = e(zj) denotes labor productivity that depends on age, skill level and labor market shock ηj.
30deﬁnes pension payments that depend on the amount of earning points accumulated during the
working periods. Note that individuals above age 60 will not receive any accidental bequests in our
model.
Having speciﬁed the household decision problem in detail, we ﬁnally want to deﬁne household
choices and the measure of households. The former thereby deﬁnes the decisions of households at a
speciﬁc state, the latter at which states households are located.









ct(·) : Z→[0,∞] ,  t(·) : Z→[0,1] , ot(·) : Z→{ 0,1} ,
a 
t(·) : Z→[0,∞] and ep 
t(·) : Z→[0,∞].11
Furthermore let for any t ∈T
ξt(·) : Z→[0,∞].
be a measure on the measurable space
 
Z , P(J) × P(S) × B(A) × B(P) × B(E) × P(D) × P(R)
 
,
where B is the Borel σ-algebra of a continuous set and P the power set of a discrete set. We say that Ht is
a set of optimal household decisions, if – given prices and public policy – Ht satisﬁes the above optimization
problem. Furthermore, we denote by ξt the measure of households at time t.
A.2 Firms behavior
Next, we want to deﬁne ﬁrms behavior.
Deﬁnition 3 (Production plan and price set) For any t ∈T let Qt = {Kt, Lt} be the production plan for
the ﬁrms and denote by Pt = {rt,wt} the set of prices for capital and labor.
The factor prices are set in a competitive way, given the production plan Qt.
Deﬁnition 4 (Competitive factor prices) We say that factor prices are competitive, if











t and ep 
t thereby deﬁne future assets aj+1 and earning points epj+1 depending on the current state and consumption
decisions.
12 Note that, due to the perfect competition assumption, corporate taxes in our model works as additional taxes to capital
income of households.
31A.3 Governmental activity
The last sector to specify is the government sector.
Deﬁnition 5 (Tax and pension policy) LetGt = {Gt,τk,Tt(·,·,·), Bt,τc,t,μt,λt, APAt,τt} deﬁne govern-
mental policy at time t, where Gt is public expenditure, τk the corporate tax rate, Tt the income tax schedule, Bt
governmental debt holdings and τc,t the consumption tax rate at time t. APAt and τt deﬁne the actual pension
amount per earnings points and τt the contribution rate to the pension system.
The government adjusts the the consumption tax rate in order to balance the tax system.
Deﬁnition 6 (Budget balance of the tax system) Given a set of household decisions Ht,am e a s u r eo f
households ξt and a set of production plans Qt and prices Pt, we say that the tax system is balanced at time
t ∈T,i f
Gt +( 1+ rt)Bt = τc
 
Z
ct(z) dξt + Ty +
τk
1− τk







wte(z)(1 −  t(z)) , p(z) , rtat(z)
 
dξt
deﬁnes revenue from income taxation.
On the other hand, the pension contribution rate is adjusted to balance the pension budget.
Deﬁnition 7 (Budget balance of the pension system) Given a set of household decisions Ht,am e a s u r e









Having speciﬁed the behavior of households, ﬁrms and the government, we can now turn to the
deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium in our model. Before we do that, we want to specify the
economic environment households, ﬁrms and the government face.
Deﬁnition 8 (Economic environment) The economic environment in our model is deﬁned as the set
E =
 
{nt}t∈T , {ψt,j,s}t∈T ,j∈J,s∈S , {πd
j,s}j∈J,s∈S , π(·|·,·) , Γ(·) , θ ,   , δk , κ
 
of population growth rates n, individual survival probabilities ψ, disability risk probabilities πd, the conditional
distribution function π for the evolvement of η, adistribution function for bequests Γ : Z→[0,1] that satisﬁes
 
Z
Γ(z) dξt = 1.
and production technology θ,  , δk and κ.
32Obviously, when we denote individual bequests as b(z)=Γ(z)Qt,w h e r e
Qt =
1




t−1(z)(1 − ψt−1,j,s) dξt,
we assure that no resources are wasted. Finally, we deﬁne an equilibrium path.
Deﬁnition 9 (Competitive equilibrium) G i v e na ne c o n o m i ce n v i r o n m e n tE and initial conditions K1 and
ξ1, a competitive equilibrium is a set of optimal household decisions {Ht}t∈T , production plans {Qt}t∈T ,
















ct(z) dξt + Gt +( 1+ nt+1)(1+ κ)Kt+1 − (1 − δk)Kt (Goods market).










⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(1− πd
j+1,s)π(η |η,s) if (j+1,s,a 
t(z),ep 
t(z),η ,0,0) ∈ Ca n dz=( j,s,a,ep,η,0,0),
1− πd
j+1,s if (j+1,s,a 
t(z),ep 
t(z),0,0,1) ∈ Ca n dz=( j,s,a,ep,η,0,0),
πd
j+1,s if (j+1,s,a 
t(z),ep 
t(z),0,1,1) ∈ Ca n dz=( j,s,a,ep,η,0,0),
1 if (j+1,s,a 
t(z),ep 
t(z),0,d,1) ∈ Ca n dz=( j,s,a,ep,η,d,1),
0 otherwise.










if 0 ∈ CA , 0 ∈ CP , 0 ∈ CD and 0 ∈ CR,
0 otherwise.
Hereby, ϕ0,σ2
ε denotes the probability density function of the normal distribution with mean 0 and vari-
ance σ2
ε .
Deﬁnition 10 (Stationary equilibrium) A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which
per capital variables and functions, as well as prices are constant over times and aggregate variables grow at
the constant rate n + κ + κn.
33B Computational appendix
This section gives an overview over the solution methods used to solve our model numerically. We
distinguish between a micro- and a macroeconomic solution method. The former is used to solve the
household problem, while the letter serves to compute equilibrium prices and quantities.
B.1 Solving the household problem
In order to compute a solution of the complex household problem, we discretize the continuous
elements of our state space Z. We therefore choose ˆ A = {a1,...,anA}, ˆ P = {ep1,...,epnP},a n d
ˆ E = {η1,...,ηnE}. We use the algorithm described in Tauchen and Hussey (1991) to obtain an ap-
proximation to the distribution of η with our set E and a suitable probability function ˆ π(·|·,·). For all
theresultingdiscretevaluesof zj we computethe optimal decision ofhouseholdsfrom the household
optimization problem described above. Since Vt+1(·) consequently is also only known in a discrete
set of points zj+1, this maximization problem can not be solved analytically. Therefore we have to use
the following numerical maximization and interpolation algorithms to compute households optimal
decision:
1. Compute householddecisionsat thelast possibleage J for all possible zJ. Notethatthe terminal
condition Vt(zJ+1)=0, households are not allowed to work anymore and they die for sure in
the next period. Hence, they consume all their resources.
2. Find the solution to the household optimization problem for all possible zj recursively using
Powell’s algorithm, see Press et al. (2001, 406ff.). Since this algorithm requires a continuous
function, we have to interpolate Vt+1(zj+1). Having computed the data Vt+1(zj+1) for all zj+1 ∈
S×A×P×E×D×Rin the last step, we can now ﬁnd a piecewise polynomial function
spt+1,j+1 that satisﬁes the interpolation conditions
spt+1,j+1(ak,epl)=EV(zj+1) (1)
for all k = 1,...,nA, l = 1,...,nP. In this paper we use multidimensional spline interpolation,
see Habermann and Kindermann (2007).
B.2 The macroeconomic computational algorithm
The computation method for the macroeconomic model follows the Gauss-Seidel procedure of Auer-
bach and Kotlikoff (1987). We start with a guess for quantities and government policy. Then we
compute prices, optimal household decisions, and value functions. This involves a discretization of
the state space which is explained in the previous section. Next we obtain the measure of households
and new macroeconomic quantities as well as the social security tax rate and the consumption tax
rate that balances government’s budgets. This information allows us to update the initial guesses.
The procedure is repeated until the initial guesses and the resulting values for quantities, prices and
public policy have sufﬁciently converged.
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